FEDERAL CIVIL PROCEDURE: STAKEHOLDER MAY FILE
BOND UNDER FEDERAL INTERPLEADER ACT RATHER
THAN DEPOSITING THE SPECIFIC PROPERTY
I N Kitzer v. Phalen Park State Bank,' the Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit determined that to invoke jurisdiction under the Federal Interpleader Act 2 a stakeholder need not deposit the specific
property in controversy, but instead may file a bond with the court.
The Phalen Park State Bank, finding itself subject to the conflicting
claims of appellant Kitzer and other parties to a hundred shares of its
stock, filed suit under the Federal Interpleader Act to determine
ownership of the stock. The bank alleged that it was a mere stakeholder with no claim to the stock. Because the stock certificates were
in Kitzer's possession and could not be deposited with the court by
the bank, it filed a $2,000 surety bond approved by the court. At trial
Kitzer sought dismissal of the suit, contending that without the deposit of the specific stock certificates the court lacked jurisdiction
under the Interpleader Act. The district court rejected this argument and at trial on the merits found for the opposing claimants.,
The court of appeals, with one judge dissenting, affirmed the district
court's ruling, finding that the bank was a bona fide stakeholder
and had filed an approved bond, thus satisfying the Act's jurisdictional requirements.4
While federal courts have always had the power to entertain suits
in interpleader, 5 prior to the existence of a statutory interpleader
action a plaintiff was restricted by certain historical limitations and
Although the availby general federal jurisdictional requirements
' 379 F.2d 650 (8th Cir. 1967).
2 28 U.S.C. §§ 1335, 1397, 2361 (1964).
8379 F.2d at 651.
4Id. at 654.
5 KIaber v. Maryland Cas. Co., 69 F.2d 934, 937 (8th Cir. 1934); Chafee, Interpleader
in the United States Courts (pts. I & 2), 41, 42 YALE L.J. 1134, 41 (1932).
0 See 3 J. MOORE. FEDERAL PRACTICE 22.03 (2d ed. 1948) [hereinafter cited as MOORE];
4 J. POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE §§ 1320-26 (5th ed. 1941) [hereinafter cited as POMEROY]; 2 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE §§ 1111-17
(14th ed. 1918); Chafee, Modernizing Interpleader,30 YALE L.J. 814, 821-44 (1921).
7 See New York Life Ins. Co. v. Dunlevy, 241 U.S. 518 (1916); Klaber v. Maryland
Cas. Co., 69 F.2d 934, 937 (8th Cir. 1934); Chafee, Interpleader in the United States
Courts (pts. I & 2), 41, 42 YALE L.J. 1134, 41 (1932); Chafee, Intertate Interpleader,33
YALE L.J. 685, 696 (1924).
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ability of interpleader was extended with the passage of the first Federal Interpleader Act in 1917,8 its most significant expansion came
with the Act of 1936, 9 which forms the basis for the present statutory

action. To invoke jurisdiction under the Act today, the interpleader
must be one in possession of money or property, or one who has
issued a note or instrument, valued at $500 or more, claimed by
parties of diverse citizenship.10 Prior to the 1986 Act, the subject
matter in controversy was required to be deposited with the court,,1
but today a court-approved bond may instead be posted in some
cases.'

2

Although the 1936 amendments as a whole have been the subject
of much scholarly comment, relatively little attention has been given
to the bond-deposit provision.' 3 The Senate committee report on the
amendments briefly noted that although the disputed subject matter
ordinarily would be deposited with the court, "situations sometimes
arise where the rigid requirement of a deposit would prevent just
relief."' 14 The leading case interpreting the bond-deposit requirement of the Act has been Austin v. Texas-Ohio Gas Company, 5 in
which the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that TexasOhio satisfied the jurisdictional requirements of the Act by depositing
with the court all the stock certificates in its possession, although
ownership of a substantially larger number of shares was in dispute.
In reaching this conclusion the court noted that the gas company still
retained some measure of control over the certificates not in its
possession and that the company had tendered this control into
a Federal Interpleader Act, ch. 113, 39 Stat. 929 (1917).
'Federal Interpleader Act, ch. 13, 49 Stat. 1096 (1936) (now 28 U.S.C. §§ 1335, 1397,
2361 (1964)); see 3 MooRE 22.06.
1028 U.S.C. § 1335 (1964).
1xConnecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Yaw, 53 F.2d 684, 685 (W.D.N.Y. 1931); Pennsylvania Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Henderson, 244 F. 877 (N.D. Fla. 1917); see 4 POMEROY

§ 1328.
28 U.S.C. § 1335 (a) (2) (1964); see Edner v. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co., 138
1-2
F.2d 327 (3d Cir. 1943).
isSee Burchmore, Interstate Interpleader Under the Federal Act of 1936, 15
Cnr.-KENT L. REv. 165, 169 (1937); Chafee, FederalInterpleader Since the Act of 1936,
49 YALE L.J. 377, 410-11 (1940); Chafee, The FederalInterpleaderAct of 19J6: 1,45 YALE
L.J. 963, 978 (1936); Frumer, On Revising the New York Interpleader Statutes, 25
N.Y.U.L. Rav. 737, 768-73 (1950); Ilsen & Sardell, Interpleader in the Federal Courts,
35 ST. JoHN's L. Rlv. 1, 48-52 (1960).
%4S. REP. No. 558, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1935); see Edner v. Massachusetts Mut.
Life Ins. Co., 138 F.2d 327 (3d Cir. 1943).
15 218 F.2d 739 (5th Cir. 1955).
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court.' 6 The court also determined that in a case involving specific
property, the "property" required to be deposited was that in the
stakeholder's possession.' 7 That it was sufficient for the gas company
to deposit only the certificates which it held was a conclusion not
necessarily based on the proposition that the specific property must
be deposited. Nevertheless, in spite of the opinion's liberal tone and
of many decisions broadly construing the Interpleader Act,1 8 a number of federal courts, either explicitly 9 or implicitly,20 have so interpreted Austin. A closer reading of the case, however, suggests that it
actually holds that where specific property is involved, the Interpleader Act allows the stakeholder to deposit only that part of the
disputed property in his possession, 2 ' an interpretation supported by
22
the case's emphasis on the extensibility of interpleader.
It is this latter interpretation of Austin that the Kitzer court
evidently adopts. Drawing on decisions in stock ownership cases28
and actions to clear title under 28 U.S.C. § 1655,24 the court concluded that either stock certificates or a stock ownership interest
could qualify as "property" under the Act. The court also indicated
that the "property" to be deposited depends upon what the stakeholder asserts to be the subject of the controversy. 25 Since the bank
had asserted that the dispute was over ownership of the stock, of
18

Id. at 744.

Id. at 744-45; accord, Wertheimer v. Bank of Nova Scotia, 140 F. Supp. 950, 953
(S.D.N.Y. 1956).
I8 See, e.g., Treinies v. Sunshine Mining Co., 308 U.S. 66 (1939), affirming 99 F.2d
17

651 (9th Cir. 1938); Sanders v. Armour Fertilizer Works, 292 U.S. 190 (1934); BJ. Van
Ingen & Co. v. Connolly, 225 F.2d 740 (3d Cir. 1955); Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. B.B.B.
Constr. Corp., 173 F.2d 307 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 917 (1949); John Hancock
Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Yarrow, 95 F. Supp. 185 (E.D. Pa. 1951); Massachusetts Mut. Life
Ins. Co. v. Weinress, 47 F. Supp. 626 (N.D. 111. 1942). But cf. American-Hawaiian S.S.
Co. v. Bowring & Co., 150 F. Supp. 449 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
1
9 Douglas-Guardian Warehouse Corp. v. Rainy Seed Co., 271 F.2d 24, 26-27 (8th Cir.
1959); see 3 MooE 22.10, at 3083-84.
20
See Metal Transp. Corp. v. Pacific Venture S.S. Corp., 288 F.2d 363, 365 (2d Cir.
1961); Gannon v. American Airlines, Inc., 251 F.2d 476, 481 (10th Cir. 1958); American
Smelting & Ref. Co. v. Naviera Andes Peruana, S.A., 182 F. Supp. 897, 898 (S.D.N.Y.
1959).
21 218 F.2d at 744-45.
22

Id. at 745-46, nn.4-7.

F.2d at 652-63, citing, e.g., Pacific Nat'l Bank v. Eaton, 141 U.S. 227, 234
(1891); First Nat'l Bank v. Fleming, 10 F.R.D. 159, 160 (D.N.J. 1950); Wackerbarth v.
Weisman, 207 Minn. 507, 510-11, 292 N.W. 214, 216 (1940).
24 379 F.2d at 653-54, citing, e.g., Jellenik v. Huron Copper Mining Co., 177 U.S. 1,
13 (1900); Thompson v. Terminal Shares, Inc., 89 F.2d 652 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
302 U.S. 735 (1937).
28 379 F.2d at 652; see note 17 supra and accompanying text.
88379
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which it still had "possession," the court found that the bank qualified as a stakeholder. 26 In discussing the bond-deposit requirements
of the Act, the court, citing Austin, noted that the Act had been
liberally construed to allow deposit of no more than the specific property in the plaintiff's possession. 27 The majority, however, did not
discuss the construction given Austin by a number of federal courts;
i.e., in cases involving specific property, the property must be deposited, and the bond provision does not apply. The court did not
specifically state why the posting of bond was appropriate in this case;
it merely indicated that this was an instance, mentioned in the
Senate committee report on the 1936 Act, where requirement of a
deposit of the specific property " 'would prevent just relief.' "28 The
dissenting judge, focusing on the example used by the Senate report
to illustrate the committee's more general language which was
quoted by the majority, concluded that the bond provision is limited
to stakeholders of a fund and to cases where the specific property
cannot be deposited. 29 Relying upon Austin and a previous Eighth
Circuit case following it, the dissenter argued that if, as the majority
found, the property were the stock ownership interest, the stock
should have been tendered into court by the bank. 80
Had the majority considered a deposit of the res necessary, it
could have required tender of ownership control as was done in
Austin. That no deposit was required for jurisdiction to attach indicates that the Kitzer majority construed the posting of bond to apply
to any situation where the res is intangible. This view would seem
to allow, for example, a party with some interest in a negotiable instrument or similar item, but without a tangible res in possession, to
avail himself of the interpleader remedy. The Kitzer decision, however, leaves unclear whether the bond-deposit provisions are truly
interchangeable alternatives, and whether the choice between deposit
and bond rests with the interpleading plaintiff, or instead, is within
the discretion of the trial court.3 1 Some commentators have seen the
-"379 F.2d at 652-54.
'7Id. at 651.
-1Id.
20 Id. at 655 (dissenting opinion).
80 Id. at 655-56; see Douglas-Guardian Warehouse Corp. v. Ramy Seed Co., 271 F.2d
24, 26-27 (8th Cir. 1959).
31 Cf. Guerin v. Guerin, 239 F.2d 909 (9th Cir. 1956); New York Life Ins. Co. v. Lee,
232 F.2d 811 (9th Cir. 1956); Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Adams, 231 F. Supp. 860
(S.D. Ind. 1964); Onyx Ref. Co. v. Evans Prod. Corp., 182 F. Supp. 253 (N.D. Tex.
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deposit requirement as necessary to enable a court to obtain sufficient
control over a disputed item to render an effective judgment. 2 A
bond, however, is "conditioned upon the compliance by the plaintiff with the future order or judgment of the court with respect
to the subject matter of the controversy."8 3 Thus, for purposes of
rendering an effective judgment, it is substantially equivalent to a
deposit of a specific res. Because the Act creates three disjunctive
jurisdictional conditions-deposit of the property, payment into court
of the value of the instrument or obligation, or deposit of a bondand because judicial approval is required only of the amount of the
bond and adequacy of the surety,8 4 choice among alternatives seemingly rests with the interpleading plaintiff. In light of the breadth of
interpleader under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 5 and the
latitudinate tenor of recent Supreme Court interpretations of the
Interpleader Act, 6 the Kitzer result, free choice among alternative
deposits, may be available to any plaintiff interpleading in the federal courts.
1959); 3 MOORE 22.10, at 3081-82, and cases cited therein. See also Fried v. United
States, 141 F. Supp. 385 (E.D.N.Y. 1956).
82 See, e.g., Chafee, Modernizing Interpleader,30 YALE LJ.814, 820 (1921); Note, 24
N.Y.U.L.Q. R.y. 894 (1949).

"28 U.S.C. § 1335 (a) (2) (1964).
8Id.
F3nF.R. Crv. P. 22; see A/S Krediit Pank v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 155 F. Supp.
30, 37 (S.D.N.Y. 1957), appeal dismissed, 303 F.2d 648 (2d Cir. 1962) (per curiam); 3
MOOR
22.10, at 3085-86.
"6See, e.g., State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523 (1967).

